Introduction

The Soviet Union is known as one of history's most violent and repressive regimes under which tens of millions of innocent civilians were killed in the chaos of war, deported, executed or imprisoned in labor camps. Joseph Stalin ordered many of these atrocities upon Russians and Scholars have studied the migrations within the Soviet Union from its inception.
Arguments surrounding the accusations of genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity committed by the Soviet state against its citizens have been enthusiastically debated within the scholarly communities of history, politics and social studies. This discourse warrants review for it has established the lens through which recent migrations have been studied. The timing of this discourse that focused on earlier Soviet Union politics arguably factors in with the oversight of later migrations. Between 1989 and 1999 over 1,852,250 people emigrated out of Kazakhstan resulting in one of the largest emigrations in history. Of these, 428,710 are known to be German. 2 Every year following the late-1980's tens of thousands of Germans left everything they knew and built to start over, again. Many scholars have legitimized these later emigrations as ethnic populations now returning to their homelands.
3 While many ethnic groups did believe there was a 'homeland' to return to, others knew there was no room for them on their forefather's land. The Russian Germans specifically were forbidden from returning to their homelands in Russia. 4 Moreover, an entire generation has grown up within their new homeland of Kazakhstan.
To collect entire livelihoods and start again requires a greater explanation than nostalgia for the 'homeland'. What actually occurred that motivated such a mass exodus of people in the 1990s?
This thesis explores the responses to this in regards to the Germans.
Russian-German is the identity given to citizens of German descent that historically came to live within the Russian Empire in an effort to escape religious persecution and economic hardship in central Europe and achieved political rights in Russia. Numerous German colonies emerged in different regions of the Russian Empire at various times and for different reasons.
Therefore, while the fate of many Russian-Germans under Stalin was synonymous, their diverse backgrounds factored into their later struggle to unite. These various Germanic groups were not referred to as Russian-Germans until after the Revolutionary Wars. This thesis aims to review and contribute to the growing scholarship documenting the experience of the German deportees. While much work has been done collecting the Soviet archives and piecing together the internal history of the Soviet Union, little has been done to document the experiences in exile that these minorities underwent and the conditions under which many left after the break-up of the Soviet Union. In his dissertation, "Nations in Exile:
zapadnogermanskih otnoshenii ,in Migratsioonnye protsessy sredi rossiiskih nemtsev: istoricheskii aspect," (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) If any subversive activities … were to take place in the Republic of Volga Germans or nearby areas and the blood were shed, the Soviet government in accordance with the wartime laws would be obliged to take punitive actions against the whole German population of the Volga region.
In order to avoid such undesirable punitive actions and prevent bloodshed, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has found it necessary to relocate the entire German population living in the Volga region to other regions [raiony] , with the provision that the relocated [Germans] have land allotted to them and state assistance to help them establish themselves in the new regions.
The purpose here isn't to determine the main trigger, but rather to understand the general reasoning behind these forced migrations. As is common with many of the deportations during this time, it is hard to pinpoint exactly when the decision was made to deport the Germans.
Operations began a couple weeks after August 12th and later included the Germans living in the "Trudarmee" is the unofficial word for labor army, or by official records "labor obligations", "labor regulations" or "labor reserves". Mainly Russian Germans used this term because, unlike other Soviets who worked for the war effort and were free to choose their workplace and move about freely, Germans could not. Many nationals served in the labor army, but Germans were the only ethnic group that was forced into labor mobilization almost in their entirety. On January 10, 1942 an official decree was issued that ordered all German men aged between seventeen and fifty to be mobilized for labor. Later that year, on October 7 th , the Ministry of Defense issued another decree to include German men aged 15-16 and 51-55 and women aged . Pregnant women or those with children under the age of three were spared.
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The labor decrees spurred yet another flood of migration across the empire.
The Soviet government planned the journey and conditions of resettlement down to the finest detail. Deportees were supposed to have adequate time to collect their belongings; escorting officials were expected to receive six rubles per person per day to feed the deportees along the way; a minimum of one doctor and two nurses equipped with necessary medical instruments were to be assigned to each train and offer medical services. Upon arrival every district authority's responsibilities were outlined, while food, fuel, and resources were all rationed out based on the anticipated number of arrivals. 32 It was all on paper. But reality differed greatly. Few were given adequate time to collect their belongings, many only had a few were far from prepared. The deportations were conducted during wartime when resources were already scarce, and deprivation and famine ensued in the years to come. These exiles also carried the stigma of 'Nazi collaboration' or disloyalty to the state. This only worsened their situation.
Life in Exile
When deportees arrived, at times it would take days before they were picked up from the train stations and sent to the village. There are reports of how representatives of villages or economic enterprises would come to the station to only select the most able workers and leave the rest for someone else to deal with. 34 The 'cherry-picking' of laborers when they were expected to house the deportees occurred throughout the 1940s; locals wanted all the benefits of a temporary, forced labor workforce to which they hold not responsibilities. 35 In 'special settlement' documents, they do not always differentiate between ethnicities but rather as problems of deportees in general. This suggests that the German situation was often similar to others.
A report from Dzhambul notes that despite instructions there was no available housing material belonging to the resettlement administration, not an uncommon situation. This
Dzhambul Oblast is where my grandmother arrived, and here administrators were expecting 10,000 deportees; 33,000 arrived. Numbers were often adjusted at the last minute and, fortunately for Oblast officials, more often numbers declined. "The "Special Settlements" were dispersed throughout the republic's oblasts and isolated the deportees from regional centers."
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Often these settlers were sent to uninhabitable regions with severe climates and poor soil forcing them to rely on support from the "regional centers" which in their best conditions were limited.
Officials frequently siphoned off resources and support contributing to and causing periods of extreme deprivation. 37 In accordance with the stigma of "enemies of the state" Germans were required to 'check in' with local commandants daily and their mobility was restricted to a roughly 20-mile radius.
Some local authorities were openly defiant despite strict instructions from the state. One instance notes that at a meeting of the Taldy-Kurgan oblast party, when discussing the issue of economic establishment of the exiles, the oblast executive chairman Sagintaev proclaimed he would not give the exiles anything because they were traitors of the motherland; they should all be shot and resources instead be given to the locals. 38 Many leaders of district party and executive committees were present during Sagintaev's speech and followed suit. They no longer bothered to house and clothe the exiles, and instead embezzled those resources for themselves and other locals.
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Constructing homes for the exiles was followed with the same insolence. In the same region of Taldy-Kurgan, 1480 homes were planned for construction, of which only 427 were completed, leaving 800 exile families in the cold without adequate housing for the winter. 40 In addition to the awful material conditions of the exiles, baths did not work and medical services Not all exiles were treated as poorly; some Oblasts were better prepared and more welcoming than others and it would be unfair to paint all Oblasts with the same broad brush.
Despite poor harvests and limited resources many Kazakhs housed and fed the exiles at best they could. Many instances of locals sharing their own food, shelter and clothing with the exiles are known. In January 1944 the locals in the Akmolinskii district alone donated over 4,000 items of warm clothing to over 26,000 settlers they had recently accepted.
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As suggested in the first half of this paper, the Soviet deportations surrounding World
War II have attracted much attention and scholars have poured over the many archives to better understand this era. Considerable effort has gone into analyzing government records, verifying their authenticity, theorizing about the rationale behind various policies, and studying the ideology that drove the Soviets to force the migration of an unprecedented portion of the population. Historians to this day deliberate and disagree on various explanations for this era in what continues to be a lively discourse. An overview of this discourse is vital in understanding the more recent analysis of the 1990 emigrations, or rather a lack thereof.
In the wake of World War II, the Soviet Union emerged as an opposing power to the United States and garnered much speculation and study. Historians studied the Soviet empire and its motivations. Learning of the mass internal migrations in the shadow of the Holocaust, it was not long until questions of genocide, ethnic-cleansing and crimes against humanity came to the forefront as major topics. The following literature review will outline the major historical interpretations surrounding the 1940's deportations of ethnic enclaves. The Soviet leadership was never committed to turning the USSR into a nation-state, because this was never the goal. 44 Martin's analysis of the deportations is best summarized in his own words:
Soviet ethnic cleansing was not accompanied by overt intentional murder. However, the ethnic deportations always included many arrests that resulted in incarceration in highmortality prison camps. Moreover, the deportations were carried out incredibly swiftly, which insured that large numbers of individuals would die of exposure, starvation, and disease both during and after the deportations, especially since the deported were placed in prison-like "special settlements." Finally, and most importantly, under Soviet conditions all deported ethnic groups (and other population categories) were stigmatized and therefore extremely vulnerable during periodic terror campaigns. The diaspora nationalities deported in the period between 1935 and 1938 were singled out for disproportionate arrest and mass execution during the Great Terror of 1937-38 to a degree that, as I will show, verged on the genocidal. Therefore, as with most cases of ethnic cleansing, the Soviet practice included substantial levels of intentional murder.
45
The first and last sentences of the above paragraph verge on contradictory so in his citations
Martin clarifies:
43 Martin, 1998, 816. 44 Ibid. 45 Martin, 1998, 822. When murder itself becomes the primary goal, it is typically called genocide… Ethnic cleansing is probably best understood as occupying the central part of a continuum between genocide on one end and nonviolent pressured ethnic emigration on the other end. Given this continuum, there will always be ambiguity as to when ethnic cleansing shades into genocide, or pressured emigration into forced relocation. Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: a) Killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
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In a 1993 report to the Security Council, United Nations Commission of Experts defines ethnic cleansing as "rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons of another ethnic or religious group." While ethnic cleansing has occurred since the beginning of history, the clarification of this term is surprisingly very recent. Earlier historians were reluctant to label the mass deportations as genocide; they used names as 'political genocide' or 'cultural genocide' or 'class genocide' because those identifications are missing from the legal definition. Later works are more inclined to argue for the act of genocide arguably because the regime also confessed to acts of genocide in 1991(sparking a separate debate). The discussion is far from over, and there most likely will never be a conclusive answer, but most historians would agree with the following:
When examining the many details of the Soviet repression, scholars must be careful to account for the regime's various overlapping and simultaneous political motives, as well as distinguish and clarify policy differences and similarities. Different political, ideological and class motives prompted the Soviet persecution of Russians (and even Communists), which of course coincided with the various ethnic prejudices, class antagonisms, and ideological beliefs that fueled Russia's attacks on its minorities. The continuing secrecy of both the Kazakh and Soviet governments proved to be a barrier for the authors of this report. The "Shakhanov Commission" which is the parliamentary group responsible for investigating the Almaty disorders was twice prevented from publishing its findings and despite being promised, has been denied access to official archives on casualties.
Jeltoqsan Riots
The Soviet government continued to deny journalists and Westerners timely access to areas of conflict in Central Asia. 66 The Helsinki Watch Report (HWR) journalists were mainly focused on the capital of Almaty and Karaganda, information about the rest of Kazakhstan was only periodically provided.
They determined it was in fact the replacement of the Kazakh leader with an ethnic
Russian who had no prior experience in the region that ignited the protests and additionally, there were other tensions with Moscow. Leaders said Kazakhstan only received about seven percent back from what they produced and the high unemployment rate among the youth was a contributing factor to the protests. 67 HWR learned that the protests in Almaty began peacefully, but who initiated the violence remains unclear. The protestors were unarmed, but the government used force. Militia and military cadets were first on the scene, later joined by Army and Ministry sources site up to 60,000 nationwide. The official death toll was three, but many assert there were more.
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The HWR report continues with a detailed analysis of the nights of student protests in Almaty through eyewitness testimonies, press-coverage and investigations of the aftermath. The report only cursory mentions the social tension and violence in other parts of Kazakhstan, addressing it as a new period of "violent local unrest, motivated by a mixture of political, economic and nationalist grievances." 70 In fact, a samizdat report dated December 1989… states that instances of social unrest occurred in an even larger number of cities: "The events widened to include Almaty, Karaganda, as well as Dzezkagan Aktyubinks, Mangyshlak, East Kazakhstan, Taldy-Kurgan, Tselingrad and other oblasts." 71 HWR identified a Soviet interview with
Procurator General Aleksandr Sukharev who acknowledged over 900 deaths due to interethnic clashes. 72 As has previously been the case, this number is likely underestimated.
Novyi Uzen Unrests
The next widely known ethnic clash in Kazakhstan occurred in a small provincial town in the western region. Sporadic clashes began between local people and representatives of ethnic minorities who were employed in the local oil processing and refinery factories in the town of Novyi Uzen. The immediate cause of unrest remains unknown but the degradation of social conditions and growth of unemployment is believed to have angered the local community.
Although Kazakhs made up the majority of the population of this region, only four to twelve percent were employed in the local industrial production. 
1989-1999 Emigrations of the Russian-Germans from Kazakhstan
During the 1980's Kazakhs were in the minority, consisting of less than forty percent of the population, while Russians, Europeans and others combined made up the majority. economy. The focus in much of the literature remains on the nation building attempts of the Kazakh government and its affects on politics, the economy and local power relations between leaders and elites. This mass flight of people has attracted little scholarly attention beyond the statistical, economical and political implications.
Literature Review
The following is a review of the studies done on post-Soviet nation building in Central
Asia. As will be demonstrated, focus remains on statistics of migration patterns, governmental records and policies, and the politics of nation building. This is not to imply that scholars have ignored the ethnicity question, or the importance of the ethnic tensions in Central Asian
Republics (CARS), certainly not. There is a strong dialogue in academia on the study of the ethnic tensions and the CAR leaders methods of dealing with them. 80 Rather, the connection between the ethnic tensions and the reasons for German mass migration is not discussed or even identified. The emigrations are not blatantly ignored, but little is done to uncover the realities of these movements on the ground. The narrative of the Russian-German emigration is summarized with all the other ethnic enclaves as a returning to the 'homeland'. Others attribute, and rightly so, economic conditions and the seeking of a better life, while only cursory mentioning that local tensions were a contributing factor. The argument is that the weak post-Soviet Kazakhstani state, bent on strategies of ethnicity-based compensation, lacked the resources to implement its programs to promote ethnic Kazakhs. Instead, it created a broad discourse of ethnic redress that was left to individual actors in individual locales to translate into political practice. In doing so, many such actors used knowledge of genealogical lineage, which undergirded sub-ethnic identities, as a marker of Kazakhness. A virtual bidding war among locales ensued over these ethnic markers that served to construct lineage identities as politically salient.
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Schatz focuses on the reaction of the policy makers to the rising of ethnic tensions and their attempts at harnessing power in the vacuum left by the Soviet state. Essentially, the Soviet Union failed at fully integrating an 'internationalist' identity of a 'Sovetski Narod' -known as the Soviet people-and at the collapse of the USSR, ethnic identity and pride was reawakened. Due to the vast diversity of people in Kazakhstan, the elites attempt at ethnic nation building in Kazakhstan also required placing sub-ethnic identities in the center of public life. and Kyrgyzstan was no exception. Emma, Lily, and Selma fled for Kaliningrad, Russia after tensions heightened. They no longer were able to provide for themselves and feel safe, so they left everything and everyone they knew to start over, again. Lily had married her husband Kostya in Kyrgyzstan and together they were able to secure a destroyed home from the Kolkhoz, known as collective farming communities in Soviet Russian. They were able to live there under the conditions that they would work for the community and repair the home. Kostya was a shepherd and Lily watched after the village baby calves. They lived in Kaliningrad until 1995 when they finally secured papers for Germany. Today my grandma Emma and great-aunt Selma live with Kostya and Lily in Germany.
My aunt Olga was the last to leave Kokterek. She had settled in and started a family with her husband Vova, but they too were soon denied food and basic necessities. At the local store, when she begged and pleaded the Kazakh owners simply answered, look at your face and look at mine, do you see a difference? Olga and Vova lacked the necessary family connections to secure documents and leave for Germany immediately, but they felt they had no other choice but to leave Kazakhstan. Their children had already stopped going to school out of fear, and then they felt that they couldn't even leave their homes safely. Vova and Olga followed my grandmother and fled for Kaliningrad. In Kaliningrad they found shelter in a deteriorating apartment, the windows and doors were long gone and a pile of debris was left waiting for them. Under similar agreements with the local Kolkhoz, Olga and Vova worked hard for their scarce accommodations. In the meantime, Nina and Lily were working to help them gather paperwork and join them in Germany. After a couple years, Olga was able to join her sisters in Germany.
My own mother left Kokterek in 1984 after she met my Russian father. They married in Krasnodar Oblast, USSR located in the northern reaches of the Caucusus and lived in villages not far from the city where my sisters and I were eventually born. My father's brother was the first to move to the United States and called for the rest of his family to join them. At the same time my mother's sisters were calling for us to join them in Germany. My parents were torn but they knew they had to leave Krasnador. Russia was a hard place for my mother to live, she hid her German identity as best she could for fear of discrimination. My father would not fare any better in Germany, deciding instead to opt for the neutral land of United States where life would be equally difficult for all. And as they say, the rest is history.
Conclusion
A friend once said, the more Swiss cheese you have, the more holes you have; therefore, the more Swiss cheese you have, the less Swiss cheese you have. 96 This is ironically pertinent to the study of history. To argue that there is a gap in the record of history is no new or revolutionary concept. It is as old as the sharing of stories. The quality and craft of developing 96 For reference see, http://uncyclopedia.wikia.com/wiki/Swiss_cheese. histories has improved dramatically over the centuries, and this thesis only aims to nominally contribute to this field by calling attention to one of these spaces in the time of our history.
The discussion pertaining to the 1940's deportations is lively and only a fraction was reviewed in this thesis. Scholars continue to explore and debate Stalin's intentions-were the mass causalities a purposeful mechanism of control or did he lose control and unintentionally create times of severe scarcity? The overwhelming academic consensus finds that at the very least the Soviet Union committed ethnic cleansing against its minority communities and in its aim of creating a 'Sovetski Narod' attempted cultural genocide. Most scholars-despite the regime's own confession-do not attribute the mass deportations of the 1940's as intentional acts of genocide. The records of vast resources allocated for these populations' survival dispel the notion of overt and intentional mass extermination. The mass emigrations of the 1990's also indicate no evidence of intentional mass murder, and no scholar argues such. However, the question of ethnic cleansing can and should be asked, yet it isn't. There was no governmental decree ordering the relocating of people, but the nation-building policies of Kazakhstan did influence the ethnic rivalries and mass migration was a product of the same period.
The attempt here is to illuminate this vacancy in the historical discourse on the Soviet Union, its surrounding republics, and to encourage further exploration of the 1990's migrations.
Due to the lack of available and verifiable information, the claim that ethnic cleansing was the undercurrent of the mass exodus from Kazakhstan is for now too far of a reach, however it deserves greater attention and debate. Scholars had flocked to the Soviet archives following its dissolution to uncover the realities on the ground and compare them with the written policies in Moscow. Many poured over thousands of documents and others recorded personal narratives in search of the full story of World War II and the deportations. This generous and thorough
